Economics, or perhaps better, market behaviour in the broadest sense have a direct impact on the production profiles of the recoverable resources. The past 10 years have shown extreme dynamics, particularly offshore with respect to how oil companies invest money in the development of new oil fields and are then confronted by shortage of equipment that is needed to develop the fields, by cash when the oil prices collapse and then by the geological opportunities. The North Sea changed from a big growth area to a mature region in a few years and is on the brink of going into terminal decline. The deep waters have arisen as a new growth area in terms of production, following the exploration successes.
Yet,producing these reserves is hampered by all kinds of constraints, not just geology, but money, equipment and business decisions as well. The result is that by and large, possible peak levels of the unconstrained sort are hard to achieve and mostly, peak levels will be lower for a longer period and arrive later too. In the following, some of the reasons will be presented.
Three points from an economist Peak oil delayed and below potential, as: equipment shortage means delays and high(er) costs (than anticipated) money considerations mean project delays and deferrals in poor price environment, especially in mature areas, and cutting of exploration drilling, focus on monetary return economics suggest fast production soon: high flow rates, short lives, thus sustained activity required to maintain production levels Whatever one's opinion about the discussion between pessimists and optimists, some issues can be treated as matters of fact.
Markets and economics are in that category. 1) Even if an oil company wishes to develop an oil field, or explore for oil, when the required equipment is not available two things happen. A) the project gets delayed, and b) the cost of obtaining the equipment for a later date increases, and with it the attractiveness of the project changes 2) Oil companies and the financial markets are focussed on money. When the oil price crashes, or the fear is there that the price will not remain high, projects are shelved, the required monetary returns upped, activity is cut back 3) With this money focus, which has come to the fore as the prime mover (whatever underlying considerations oil companies may have to do so), the economics of new projects are altered. High financial returns means that new developments should deliver high production as soon as possible. That way returns areimproved and risks are lowered.
Well costs and hire rates North Sea 1994 Sea -2001 Unfortunately, things do not always og the way they are supposed to og. When the oil companies had large amounts of money and allocated that to oil (and gas) development, in the mid nineties, the equipment markets (the drilling rigs for instance) were not up to the task, especially not for deep water. Hire rates for the equipment rose rapidly, and thus rose the well costs. The example here is for the North Sea, more in particular the Norwegian sector. However, the pattern is the same everywhere, as these markets are global and interactive.
Quadruppling the equipment rates had a huge impact on the cost for an individual well. Yet even at those rates, the equipment can not be built and operated in an economically sound and attractive way. Fleet expansion did not arise at a sufficient scale to explore and develop all the leases and prospects available. Consequently, the development of offshore oil and gas will face comparatively high costs and regular shortage, resulting in delays and optimisation of assets to be explored and developed (i.e. Less activity).
Here is the impact of the mid-nineties surge in offshore activity. The cost of finding and developing oil and gas in terms of dollars per barrel of reserves added (through drilling, not acquisition), had been falling steadily since the peak of 1981/2. Much of the constant decline has been attributed to improving technology. However, the peak of the early eighties was caused by the biggest drilling boom ever. By definition, when doing that on such a large scale, the average reserves per new well start to fall rapidly, and thus the costs per barrel increase rapidly too. When the oil price started to slip, this process was reversed, spending lowered and drilling activity significantly reduced. On average, the costs will fall, as the reserves per well rise. By the early nineties, this process had run its course, and then when the deep waters of the Gulf of Mexico were being drilled, the costs rose rapidly again, despite all technological progress. As new driling equipment tends to be more expensive too. Even though large reserves were found and high flow rates achieved, costs could not be controlled. Only when the oil price crashed and the oil companies decided to drill much less, did the pressure fall in the equipment markets and prices fell. The prospects for low costs are not here, as these equipment markets are held at the margin of capacity and now the average fields discovered are falling in size too, providing for a double whammy on the future average costs.
Marginal productivity
Finding & Dev. costs offshore US
Money considerations E&P budgets: price dependent
Money is the prime mover of the business. Over the years, the oil companies have shown a behaviour of spending money on exploration and development that is heavily influenced by the changes in the price of oil. Not the expected price, but the prices of the past. The relationship has become particularly close in the aftermath of the "oil price shock" of 1998. A shock is not always upwards. The price crash led to a shock for the oil companies as it directly impacted their income and available cash. At the very moment of the highest costs in more than a decade, the income side was collapsing. Spending was cut back drastically in 1999 and with it activity. 2000 saw a jump in spending after stronger oil prices, but the absolute levels were much lower. 2001 was another year of increased spending, and 2002 is largely flat on a worldwide basis (as the US market is weak).
UK Drilling activity 1998 -2001
As an example of the real impact on activity, the UK shows how fast drilling was cut following the crash of the oil prices, and how much longer it took to pick up again. In the meantime, exploration drilling has suffered delays and development drilling has come too late to stave of the production fall. Add to that in the UK the average fields under development are considerably smaller than those drilled in 1998, and the impact on production becomes even more dramatic, since activity should have reached much higher levels.
The future of the North Sea is not 7 Mbd or more by middecade as forecast by the main agencies before. The reasons are quite straightforward. The big fields have been brought into production already, and those remaining that are relatively large (in Norway) are not scheduled to come on stream before 2003/2004. At thesame time the large old fields are in perpetual decline, and production falls rapidly in those fields, in many cases by 10-20% per year. What happened in the nineties, spurring growth and then stable production against most people's expectations except those who looked at the fields, was a number of large fields in Norway that were brought onstream and in the UK a very high pace of development of satellite fields. There are two problems related with this strategyin the UK. Firstly, there is no eternal pool of large satellite fields. By definition, the fields get smaller and smaller. As the table above shows, average production of fields added and currently planned falls rapidly. Thus increasing numbers offields need to be brought into production. Thus, secondly, when activity collapses as it did in 1999 and 2000, production collapses too, and almost instantly. A large number of developments are visible, but the majority will not be developed at the time horizon. The potential in resources may be there, but the markets are not co-operating. A new umbilical may now take almost a year to get hold of.
Economics and geology meet
North Sea 1985 Sea -2005 N. Sea peak capacity additions 1999 -2005 As said earlier, the North Sea example shows clearly what happens in the actual development of oil fields. Economics and geology meet, as the earlier crash in activity is being reversed in total numbers of projects, yet the amounts of oil added are much smaller since the average field size being developed is falling rapidly. This is due to two things. Firstly, there are not many large fields left and secondly, cash consciousness and nervousness about oil price developments makes the oil companies conservativeand thus opting for smaller developments as those deliver quick returns.
Faster, faster: new oil Implies higher turnover of fields Over the years, the way fields are developed has changed. From large fields, with high and sustained output over a long period, production has switched to higher peak rates and faster decline. In the deep waters, with the US Auger field as an example, the fields are produced at very high rates over a short period. That way the risk of the field is reduced, as cash is returned early in the field's life.Satellites are mostly produced in the same way.
A typical development profile can be illustrated with the deep water Gulf of Mexico. Installation of hub facilities, from which numerous subsea tie-backs can be produced once the main field goes off plateau. With high production rates, that moment arrives quickly, and so sustained drilling and development activity is required to maintain and increase production. There is another element here too. The approach implies that peak rates are constrained by the major production facilities, so that the reserves are produced over a longer period as the satellite fields will be developed in a sequence to optimise the processing and transportation capacity. Peak is hence lowered and spread over time.
As said in the previous page, satellite tie-backs to the main facilities make use of free-falling capaicty in most cases (some production facilities are specifically designed to have more capacity than is needed for the main field itself, f.i. The Marco Polo TLP). It means that production is vulnerable to money, and the more so as the production rates are very high. A reduction in activity is quickly reflected in the production figures, as can be seen from the third quarter 2000.
The Minerals Management Service, responsible for the GoM, recently noted the same phenomenon. Overall peak rates are subdued because of money considerations, and production falls off quickly.
Ramping up
GoM deep water devt. & production USG deep water production Hubs grow, satellites sustain US Gulf production Counting on deep to grow Despite all kinds of predictions and assumptions that production from the shallow waters of the Gulf of Mexico would rebound rapidly with high oil prices, no such thing actually happened in 2000 after the crash of 1998. In fact, decline only speeds up. Especially as the focus is on natural gas drilling. Deep water is therefore the main thrust for sustaining production levels in the Gulf of Mexico. The Minerals Management Service has been providing production forecasts for several years now, which invariably have had to be adjusted downwards as the speed of development was much lower than expected. Now the agency notes in its latest report ("Deepwater GoM, America's expanding frontier" http://www.gomr.mms.gov) that not even 10% of the available leases can be drilled on an annual basis over the next years, as there simply is insufficient drilling capacity. One can safely count on further delays in the build-up of production.
Dr. Campbell has estimated that approx. 60 Gb of oil can be recovered from deep water. The original chart shows what might have been achieved had all factors been in place (rigs, production facilities, money, etc.). The adjusted profile shows what the impact is likely to be of the service market inefficiencies that have been hampering development since 1995/6. This is the end-result of the earlier considerations. It is a combination of the Hubbert-approach of Dr. Campbell, modified for actual field developments and likely disturbances in the service (equipment) markets. The total recoverable resource base has been adjusted downwards by Dr. Campbell to 60-65 Gb from an original 85 Gb estimate in the mid-nineties. It may be too pessimistic, it may be optimistic. In any case, the Gulf of Mexico discoveries are getting smaller rapidly and also for Brazil the oil companies are saying that the exploration potential is too small to be attractive, suggesting that the exploration peak is past. With the complications of the service markets taken into account, the peak/plateau production rate is expected to rise to 9 Mb/d at around 2010. The build-up of the peak has been been considerably slowed down compared to the original estimate, and it may still prove to optimistic given the long lead times of the large projects required to reach these production levels, the large capital investments required and the cautious approach of the big Deep water production potential Impeded by equipment markets
CONCLUSIONS
Nature's habit of putting much oil in a few large fields and much less in many small ones means high activity is needed to sustain production levels, let alone grow it. Money's imperative means high production fast, i.e. Deplete rapidly In the meantime, equipment markets spoil the party by being a constraint and thus pushing up prices/costs, resulting in fewer wells and holding back peak production both in level and in time. (as do merging oil companies).
The examples from offshore can readily be applied to other areas or types of oil being developed. It goes for the oil sands developments in Canada, but also for the projects in Russia. Even there, a massive build-up in production will require large amounts of equipment. It may be available, or it may not be available. And there too, the Western approach of developing oil means faster production against a loss of recoverable resources in many cases. The best bet is that the build-up will be slower, leading to a lower peak for a longer period.
